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Institutional divergence in economic 
development 
Jonathan B. Wight1 
Introduction 
The Anglo-American capitalist model (AACM) encompasses a set of theories 
and policies that advance the classical objectives of individual autonomy, 
wealth acquisition, and economic growth. In the twentieth century, the neo-
classical goal of short-run Pareto efficiency was added yet remains in possible 
tension with these other aims. The AACM generally upholds the primacy of 
markets as the means for achieving its normative ideals through private, 
decentralized actions, with some exceptions. In the modern political arena this 
ideology is associated with the Reagan-Thatcher revolution of the 1980s and 
provides a framework for many who oppose statist solutions to social problems 
(Steger and Roy 2010). The AACM has come under attack from a variety of 
perspectives because of its assumptions of perfectly rational traders, competi-
tive markets, incentive compatibilities, low transaction costs, informational 
symmetries, and no externalities (Stiglitz 2007; Kay 2004). This paper examines 
a different critique arising from the a-historical and a-institutional manner in 
which the AACM has been adopted by some neoclassical policy makers. This 
criticism, incidentally, also applies to statist models adopted in the 1950s that 
likewise ignored institutional constraints and path dependency issues. 
While the AACM ideology traces back in various forms to Smith, Ricardo, 
and other writers of the classical era, its principles are widely known in Latin 
American and other developing countries by the label neoliberalism - asso-
ciated with neoclassical economic policies adopted during the last two dec-
ades of the twentieth century. After the Second World War, virtually all 
developing countries had embraced statist ideologies and economic interven-
tions in order to overcome perceived market deficiencies. While state planning 
and protectionism resulted in rapid industrialization and GDP growth in 
many countries, these policies often increased inequality and ultimately 
proved to be unsustainable, as evidenced by Latin America's debt crisis of 
1982. The neoliberal economic revolution, known as the 'Washington 
Consensus', arose to provide a coherent set of policies used to restructure 
countries experiencing external debt crises (Williamson 1990). The first 
fundamental welfare theorem (the so-called 'invisible hand' theorem) that 
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developed in neoclassical economics during the 1950s supported the view that 
laissez-faire markets could maximize the satisfaction of all feasible consumer 
preferences. While neoclassical economists make numerous assumptions and 
qualifications in deriving this result, in simplified form the first fundamental 
welfare theorem seemed to validate the simplistic and stereotypical view of 
Adam's Smith's non-interventionist approach to development. For Smith, 
however, economic analysis and institutions are deeply intertwined; hence, the 
neoliberalism of the 1980s and 1990s was in many ways quite different from 
Adam Smith's conception of the invisible hand or the development process he 
envisioned. 
In particular, Smith did not emphasize short-run efficiency but rather long-
run growth. Moreover, Smith did not insist that long-term growth required 
any particular set of policies or institutions, such as those promulgated in the 
Washington Consensus. While Smith would share much in common with the 
ideology of neoliberalism, this paper develops the thesis that Smith's approach 
to policy making is informed by and imbedded in culture, ethical norms, 
power structures, and other institutions. Smith, who chided Fran~ois Quesnay 
(the 'speculative physician') for a similar mistake, argued that diversity of 
institutions is both expected and desirable for the unfolding of development. 
Attempting to implement an ideal or perfect system would be a fool's errand, 
because history and path-dependency can suggest acceptable alternatives that 
work reasonably well, and often better than those derived from pure theory. 
Smith's rhetoric was soaring and ideological, but his policy prescriptions were 
incremental and context specific, reflecting concern for justice and process. 
The following section outlines the fall of AACM as a credible ideology 
during the first half of the twentieth century and its replacement with statist 
development thinking. The third section explores the rise of the neoliberal 
model in Europe in the 1930s, and its application to the neoclassical model in 
the 1980s. The fourth section demonstrates that Smith's AACM model is 
nuanced and substantially different from the neoliberal model in terms 
of policy implementation. The final section provides conclusions on the 
usefulness and survivability of the AACM. 
The fall of AACM and the rise of development planning 
By mid-twentieth century, the Anglo-American capitalist model was in ser-
ious disarray following the Great Depression and World War II (Plehwe 2009; 
Lewis 1969). The depression had shown the fallacy of Say's Law that markets 
would self-correct, and had been replaced by Keynesian counter-cyclical fiscal 
policies to combat falling aggregate demand. The world war, meanwhile, had 
demonstrated the capacity of central planning in the Pentagon to mobilize 
vast resources for investment, production, and distribution. The Soviet Union 
also emerged from the war using a growth model that seemed superior due to 
high rates of investment. In this post-war milieu, many developing countries 
gained their independence (such as India) and others concluded civil wars 
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(such as China). Other countries in Latin American, which had been 
independent since the early nineteenth century, sensed an opportunity to 
break neocolonial relationships with Great Britain and the United States. 
The world was ripe for economic experimentation using the levers of central 
government authority to force along the development process. 
Since the late nineteenth century, a number of economists had been pre-
paring the intellectual groundwork for the movement away from AACM 
through arguments known today as the "socialist calculation debate" (Levy 
and Peart 2008). Could a planned economy replicate the efficiency of a 
market system? More importantly, could it do better? The AACM relied 
upon the epistemological belief that no policy maker could ever amass or 
process enough information to make centralized interventions sensible (Hayek 
1945). According to this view, millions of consumers and producers - acting 
in their own best interests - would generate the superior wisdom of the 
decentralized market process. However, in addition to theoretical work on 
planning, Wassily Leontief's research on input-output models in the 1930s 
and 1940s seemed to supply policy makers with the practical information 
needed for planning execution. Not coincidentally, the Second World War 
produced a shift in economics research toward interventionism because 
economists - no longer simply theorists - were given wartime positions in 
government. One of the founders of linear programming recalls how many 
economists came away from this applied experience with the notion that 
development was a mechanical process that could be controlled through 
central planning: 
Linear programming can be viewed as part of a great revolutionary 
development which has given mankind the ability to state general goals 
and to lay out a path of detailed decisions to take in order to 'best' 
achieve its goals when faced with practical situations of great complexity. 
(Dantzig 2002: 42) 
Even as computers and linear programming were in their infancy, developing 
countries optimistically adopted socialist approaches to address wealth crea-
tion and poverty mitigation. In 1951, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru of 
India released the first Five-Year Plan that led to government investments in 
dams and other agricultural infrastructure. In 1956, India's second Five-Year 
Plan pushed government investments into steel and other heavy industries -
following the lead of Stalinist and Maoist development plans. A subsequent 
Five-Year Plan nationalized banks and imposed price controls in key sectors. 
In Latin America, meanwhile, prominent economists contested the notion 
that trade based on comparative advantage would lead to greater wealth in 
the long run. Argentine economist Raul Prebisch became in 1948 the director 
of the Economic Commission for Latin America at the United Nations and, 
in 1964, the founder and first secretary-general of the UN Conference on 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD). These positions offered a bully pulpit 
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in which he highlighted the key failings of the Ricardian trade model upon 
which the AACM relied. 
In The Economic Development of Latin America and its Principal Problems 
(1950), Prebisch outlined the theory which became widely known as the Pre-
bisch-Singer hypothesis. According to this view, rich Western countries export 
industrial products that experience rapid technological innovation. These 
products also have high income elasticities of demand. By contrast, develop-
ing countries export agricultural and mineral commodities with low income 
elasticities of demand and low potential for technological innovation. As 
world income rises, industrial good demand grows much faster than com-
modity demand. In addition, industrial producers can gain market power 
through oligopolies and patents while it is more difficult for commodity pro-
ducers to acquire any long-lasting leverage, given high price elasticities of 
supply. The prediction that emerges from this structural analysis is that the 
terms of trade for developing countries will inevitably fall over time (Prebisch 
1950: 9). Empirical evidence in the 1950s and 1960s supported the terms of 
trade pessimism that developing countries had to export more commodities 
each year simply to retain the same level of real imports as they had pre-
viously; in other words, developing countries were riding a downward eco-
nomic escalator. Prebisch urged them to jump off, by rejecting the AACM in 
favor of protectionism. 
Other researchers argued along different lines that developing countries had 
been forced to acquire a comparative advantage in commodities as part of a 
deliberate imperialistic strategy by developed countries. For example, British 
merchants financed, built, and then operated the railroads in Argentina in 
order to open up the pampas for beef and wheat exports (Wright 1974). The 
emphasis was entirely on enhancing exports and not on developing an inte-
grated transportation network that would lead to balanced growth. A hod-
gepodge of rail lines emanated from Buenos Aires to the hinterland, but these 
were often of different gauges and could not interact with each other (Duncan 
1937). The introduction of railroads substantially altered the production pos-
sibilities curve for Argentina in favor of agriculture and away from industry 
because rural areas could trade only with the port city, but not laterally with 
each other. The lack of planning and uncoordinated competitive efforts that 
led to this outcome are cited as a major failure of Argentine development in 
this period (Duncan 1937: 578). Similar examples of 'export-enclave' produc-
tion investments were made throughout Latin America and Africa. Hence, 
the view that comparative advantage arose from historical accidents of cli-
mate and natural resource endowments needs to be reconsidered, especially 
since some resource endowments were not accidents at all - they were 
designed by imperial powers. 
The anti-trade conclusions of Prebisch's structural approach also coincided 
with those of dependency theorists such as Paul Baran, Paul Sweezy, and 
Andre Gunder Frank (Frank 1966). Dependency theory posits that 'center' 
countries use their power to exploit 'periphery' areas for resources and to 
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provide markets for finished industrial products. Both Britain and the United 
States intervened overtly and covertly (with the complicity of local elites) to 
thwart political efforts to create balanced developmental policies, thereby 
creating dependency according to critics (Lewellen 1995). Disruptions to the 
global trading system during World War I, the Great Depression, and World 
War II revealed that developing countries could naturally develop industries 
in the absence of free trade (Frank 1966). Dependency theory became a major 
intellectual counterpoint to the AACM in major universities in Latin America 
and elsewhere in departments of political science, sociology, and anthro-
pology. The narrative story of colonial and neocolonial oppression in Latin 
America and Africa fueled the belief - along with Prebisch's empirical evi-
dence - that the AACM was simply an ideological tool adopted by those who 
stood to gain from it. 
With these factors as the intellectual backdrop, the AACM had few 
adherents in the early 1950s in the Latin American capitals of Rio, Buenos 
Aires, and Mexico City - or, for that matter, in Delhi, Djakarta, and other 
Asian political centers. In their quest to jump-start growth, governments 
established or nationalized public monopolies in telecommunications, petro-
leum, airlines, and other strategic investments; stimulated infant industry 
manufacturing for domestic consumption via high tariffs (Import Substituting 
Industrialization or ISi); fixed exchange rates (generally overvalued); imposed 
capital controls; forced private and public banks to loan at below-market 
interest rates to selected industrial borrowers; set price controls on basic 
goods; and provided substantial tax subsidies for investments. 
ISi in Latin America involved successive waves of industrial planning and 
promotion using imported capital and technology (Franko 2007). In Stage 1, 
high tariff barriers were imposed on finished consumer products such as 
automobiles. In Brazil, almost all the major American and German manu-
facturers (GM, Ford, Volkswagen, Mercedes, and others) jumped the tariff 
wall to set up assembly plants, using capital and parts imported with no 
duties. In Stage 2, high tariffs were placed on intermediary inputs (steel, glass, 
tires, and motors) to encourage Firestone, Pirelli, and other suppliers to 
similarly make the jump. In Stage 3, high tariffs on machinery gave infant 
industry protection to Brazil's nascent capital goods industry. While private 
foreign direct investments and infrastructure loans from the World Bank 
supplied the initial capital, by the mid- l 970s commercial banks from around 
the world were pouring hundreds of billions of petrodollars into Latin 
America and earning high returns in these markets. 
On the surface at least, Latin America's rejection of the AACM had paid 
off. Today, Brazil is a major exporter of industrial products, from cars to 
commercial airplanes. Yet the cost of this accomplishment was high. Because 
ISi emphasized the domestic manufacture of products previously imported, it 
ipso facto meant disregarding the insights of comparative advantage for 
lowest cost production. Industrial products were initially of poor quality and 
commanded high prices in the domestic market, often exceeding world prices 
314 Jonathan B. Wight 
by more than 100 per cent (Franko 2007: 63). Huge government deficits run 
up by state-owned companies swamped fiscal budgets, leading to bouts of 
hyperinflation. Fixed or pegged exchange rates were not able to adjust, and 
vastly overvalued currencies resulted. The high price of domestic currency 
impaired the traditional export market for agricultural commodities, resulting 
in a diminished ability to earn hard currency. Meanwhile, the huge value of 
imports required to maintain the burgeoning domestic industry meant that 
most countries used state favoritism to allocate scarce foreign exchange. 
Bribery and corruption followed. When world interest rates climbed steeply 
because of US monetary contractions in the early 1980s, Latin America went 
into a deep financial crisis. The 'lost decade' of the 1980s in Latin America is 
a testament to the problems of state intervention and the ultimate collapse of 
ISi (Franko 2007: ch. 4). 
Many East Asian countries followed similar interventionist policies in the 
1950s, yet are credited with being much quicker to switch to export-led stra-
tegies (World Bank 1993). East Asian countries also tended to have more 
balanced fiscal budgets, so that inflation was less of a concern. In addition, 
East Asian societies generally financed investment from domestic savings and 
were less prone to external financial shocks (but there are exceptions, such as 
South Korea in the 1970s and the East Asian crisis in 1998). Starting in 1978, 
China gradually began to free resources for private use and for international 
trade, while India remained highly interventionist until 1991. One by one, 
developing countries that had discarded the AACM found themselves 
returning to the fundamental doctrines of global trade, fiscal stewardship, and 
wealth creation through markets. We tum now to this transformation with a 
focus on Latin America. 
The rise of neoliberalism 
The AAC ideology had been a dominant feature of many Latin American 
countries in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries under the neocolo-
nial influence of the United States and Great Britain. Economic collapse in 
the 1980s forced the reintroduction of the AACM to policy making (under 
the label neoliberalism) - using the visible hand of the World Bank and IMF 
as levers. These institutions provided advice and emergency funds, and were 
the score keepers whose adjustment loans provided a signal to private inves-
tors that reforms were underway. Before addressing neoliberalism in this 
modem usage it is necessary to briefly consider the origins and transforma -
tion of the term (for a thorough discussion, see the essays in Mirowski and 
Plehwe 2009). 
Alexander Riistow, the German economist credited with coining the term 
·neoliberal' in 1938, was disillusioned with Germany's hierarchical, corpor-
atized economy that restricted liberties; at the same time, he rejected the 
failed laissez-faire policies he associated with Adam Smith (Hartwich 
2009: 6). The German imperial economy at the start of the twentieth century 
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had been highly protectionist and cartelized, serving the interests of heavy 
industry and the Kaiser's political and military objectives. The goal of catch-
ing up and surpassing Britain required the antithesis of the AACM: in 
Germany the invisible hand of markets was thought to produce the chaos of 
'ruinous competition' (Hartwich 2009: 11). By contrast, state-led (or 'orga-
nized') capitalism was thought to produce methodical and predictable pro-
gress. Three decades later, Hitler's obsession with state-led industrialization 
and militarizing represented continuity with this past. 
Riistow and other German economists such as Ludwig Erhard, Walter 
Eucken, Wilhelm Ropke, and Alfred Miiller-Armack proposed a new liber-
alism, a 'Third Way', which was a mix of the best parts of free markets and 
socialism. In line with the AACM, government would provide and enforce the 
economic rules, but would otherwise not pick the winners. In line with soci-
alism, the state would provide various safety nets, such as unemployment 
insurance, wage subsidies, and various types of redistributions, such as free 
public education and high taxes on inheritance. The state would also ensure 
competition by preventing monopolies (Hartwich 2009: 17). These neoliberal 
economists participated in the Mont Pelerin society, provoking serious argu-
ments with Ludwig von Mises and others (Hartwich 2009: 21). The envi-
sioned 'Third Way' eventually became West Germany's 'Social Market 
Economy' after the Second World War (Ptak 2009). 
As originally invoked, neoliberalism is indeed quite different from the 
AACM, and equally different from the neoclassical efficiency programs 
pushed by the Washington Consensus in the late twentieth century. Moreover, 
the term 'neoliberal', in its modem pejorative incarnation, has often come to 
mean the imposition of AACM policies in developing countries. Imposition 
implies coercion, and one must ask, to what extent were Latin American 
countries in the debt crisis of 1982, and East Asian countries in the crisis of 
1998, forced to adopt neoliberal policies against their wills? From an AACM 
perspective, coercion would not be possible in a situation of secure property 
rights, freedom to engage in or refrain from trade, and other basic liberties. 
Yet from a dependency theory perspective, none of these basic rights was 
assured. 
The Third World debt crisis of 1982 was mainly a Latin American crisis, 
since the predominance of commercial bank loans had been to this region, 
amounting to more than $300 billion (Franko 2007: 79). Much of this was 
dollar-denominated floating rate debt, tied to world spot rates. The rapid rise 
of interest rates in the early 1980s pushed up debt servicing payments to 
unsustainable levels. In addition, Latin American commodity exports had 
collapsed in the world-wide recession. When Latin American countries could 
no longer earn the foreign exchange needed to service their loans, these bank 
assets were technically in default. But Latin American borrowers were "too 
big to fail' because writing off these loans would have essentially bankrupted 
all of the world's major banks, who did not have sufficient reserves to cover 
these losses. To keep the world financial system afloat, major banks were 
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pressured by regulators to issue new loans so as to keep debtor accounts 
afloat. 
As the lenders of last resort, the IMF and World Bank played important 
roles in bringing commercial banks to the bargaining table. Without this 
clearinghouse, each bank would have been left to muddle along by itself. It is 
likely that the world's major multinational banks would have quickly gone 
bankrupt had they individually and simultaneously tried to negotiate loan 
restructuring with the multitude of debtor countries. Competition among 
banks would lead to a Prisoners' Dilemma: private banks would have little 
incentive individually to cooperate and release new funds unless all banks 
cooperated. As the convener and enforcer of loan conditions, the IMF had 
huge bargaining power to enforce cooperation. 
By being cajoled to band together under the aegis of the IMF, commercial 
banks could thus act as a banking cartel. The terms and conditions imposed on 
debtor countries were unilateral and could be considered coercive given the cir-
cumstances. From the perspective of the poor in developing countries, the rolling 
over of old loans with new loans constituted 'involuntary' borrowing since the 
benefits accrued to banks and elites, but the obligations for repayment fell to 
workers (Franko 2007: 91). lt is ironic that the conditions imposed (later known 
as the Washington Consensus) would be associated with the AACM, since the 
terms were created by a closed process of financial elites acting in collusion. 
Little wonder that the neoliberal revolution came to acquire a solidly derogatory 
connotation, at least in the 1980s and 1990s in debtor developing nations. In the 
East Asian crisis of 1997-98, for example, neoliberal policies were again used by 
the IMF playing the role of a financial gatekeeper. The image of this coercive 
power was visually captured by IMF Director-General Michel Camdessus (with 
folded arms) overseeing Indonesian President Suharto's signing of a letter of 
agreement in 1998 (Chang 2008; Getty Images 1998). 
The three pillars of the Washington Consensus were to stabilize, liberalize, 
and privatize markets in countries experiencing fiscal deficits, inflation, and 
current account deficits. Stabilizing the macro economy required cutting gov-
ernment spending and reducing monetary growth. As real income fell and 
real interest rates rose, the induced recession would lower imports and con-
strain wages, making imports less attractive and exports more attractive. 
Rising real interest rates would stem capital outflows and potentially attract 
capital inflows. The second pillar of reform was to liberalize markets by 
reducing tariffs, eliminating price controls on food, currency, and other sec-
tors, and by opening up financial markets to the free flow of capital (although 
not labor). The third pillar addressed the privatization of government-owned 
enterprises (GOES). Injecting the profit motive in GOES would in theory 
reduce costs by eliminating bloated payrolls, increase product and service 
qualities by responding to consumer demands, and attract foreign investment 
and technology, thereby alleviating the external disequilibrium. 
It is hard to imagine that Adam Smith would object to any of these policies 
as guiding principles. But what he likely would have questioned is the rigid 
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implementation, ignoring time and circumstance. We tum now to this 
discussion. 
Smith's pragmatism in development policy 
Viner (1927) noted the numerous ways in which Smith veered from a dog-
matic adherence to laissez-faire policy making. That is, while Smith's rhetoric 
soared in defense of the inalienable rights of persons to seek their own for-
tunes through individual effort, he did not assume that actually bringing 
about a system of perfect liberty would ever be feasible or desirable. More-
over, there were specific instances in which individual liberty needed to 
be restrained by the state in order to promote the goals of stability or 
growth. This section develops these points in the areas of financial markets, 
labor markets, international trade, and the path dependent nature of the 
development process. 
Financial markets 
Financial market liberalization was a key tenant of the Reagan-style AACM 
in the 1980s and played an importunate role in the neoliberal reforms 
endorsed by the IMF and World Bank. Larry Summers, former chief econo-
mist at the World Bank (and subsequently Secretary of the Treasury), believed 
that free markets in capital and foreign exchange improved the overall effi-
ciency of global markets. While there were occasional currency collapses, 
Summers equated these to the infrequent but spectacular crash of a Boeing 
747. Efficiency would dictate that we keep flying such planes because the risks 
were low and the benefits large. In what seems paradoxical today (given the 
USA's present reliance on Chinese and Brazilian capital inflows) Summers 
noted in 1999 that 'there are few things with as great a potential to raise 
human welfare as the creation of a safe and sustainable system for the flow 
of capital from the developed world to the developing one' (cited in Wolf 
2002: 46). 
A plethora of critics attacked this fundamental tenet of AACM. The ana-
logy of free capital flows to flying a jumbo jet is mistaken: developing coun-
tries have thin financial markets and an appropriate analogy is that of flying a 
single propeller Cessna: the death rate in such small planes is tenfold higher 
than in jumbo jets. Joseph Stiglitz, who was also chief economist of the World 
Bank, notes that in practice capital market liberalizations have not worked as 
advertised to stimulate investment and growth. Stiglitz posed this question: 
Given the overwhelming theory and evidence against capital market lib-
eralization, one wonders: how could the major international organization 
responsible for promoting growth and stability have promoted a policy 
that seemed so contrary to its objectives? 
(Stiglitz 2002: 221) 
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The answer, according to Stiglitz, is that the directors of the IMF were 
instilled with AACM ideology and became blinded to facts. Ideology trumped 
science. Wolf states the problem astutely and with prescience for the great 
global contraction of 2008: 'Too many countries have been devastated by 
financial crises that have resulted from throwing open poorly regulated 
financial systems under-pinned by comprehensive government guarantees. 
While liberalization is desirable, it has to be done in the right way' (Wolf 2002: 
51, emphasis added). 
Adam Smith had similar reservations about liberal financial markets. 
Britain had endured the South Sea Bubble of 1720 and the Scottish banking 
crisis of 1772 (Rockoff, this volume). Smith was thus concerned about 
financial speculation as a cause of imprudent lending and financial melt-
down. In The Wealth of Nations Smith advocated government regulations 
that would prevent speculators from squandering capital that could be 
better employed. Institutional regulations were needed (in this case) to har-
monize private passions with the public interest. Smith noted that the nat-
ural flow of capital will largely be toward investments creating the greatest 
individual opulence, which when summed over the nation produce the 
greatest national opulence. Private and public interests thus converge. But 
some lenders can make more money offering loans to 'profligates' whose 
activities contribute more to consumption than to growth. Smith thus 
favored an interest rate ceiling of 5 per cent that would create a shortage of 
loanable funds (Smith 1976b, WN II.iv.14-15). Since risk-taking would be 
constrained by lower returns, banks would advance credit only to their most 
trustworthy clients. weeding out speculative borrowers whose private aims 
were not in keeping with society's objectives. Smith also advocated limiting 
paper bank notes issues to £5 and higher, which would restrict their circu-
lation to wealthier merchants (Rockoff, this volume). Such mild paternalism 
would keep the poor from suffering 'a very great calamity' in the case of 
bank failure (WN II.ii.90) but clearly would violate the modem principle of 
Pareto efficiency. 
In a related discussion in which the invisible hand appears. Smith con-
sidered the problem of capital flight. He theorized that security concerns 
would lead merchants to congregate funds domestically, hence no regulations 
on capital exports would be needed to harmonize private with public interests 
(WN IV.ii.3-6). The preference for home country investments is not a neces-
sary feature of all economies, however. That is, the incentives that give rise to 
the trust, character, and legal system required to create such preferences are 
idiosyncratic to the confluence of events. institutions. and individuals popu-
lating a time and place. Were Smith to offer advice to Latin American coun-
tries with weak existing financial markets. poor legal systems for protection of 
property, and a long history of capital flight, it is at least debatable as to 
whether he would have recommended some controls on short-run capital 
flows to discourage speculation. The two preceding points make clear that 
Smith was not promoting global market efficiency but rather dynamic growth 
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in the home country. Smith was willing to sacrifice some freedom and some 
short-run efficiency to promote this end. 
Labor markets 
In the area of labor markets, Smith's aims and those of AACM coincide in 
theory and only partially in practice (Levy and Peart 2009). Smith called 
attention to the plight of workers facing monopsony employers: 
We rarely hear, it has been said, of the combinations of masters 
[employers], though frequently of those of workmen. But whoever ima-
gines, upon this account, that masters rarely combine, is as ignorant of 
the world as of the subject. 
(WN I.viii.13) 
To some extent the neoliberal reforms called for by the World Bank address 
the problems of monopsony in labor markets. In Why Africa Had to Adjust, 
the World Bank (1994) highlighted numerous government marketing boards 
that produce a large wedge between the world price of commodities and the 
price paid to peasant producers. Special interests, notably government leaders, 
earn this rent and use it to solidify their power to block reforms. Smith would 
have both understood this situation and applauded the Bank's attempts to 
redress it. 
Yet the neoliberal reforms in Latin America of the 1980s were largely per-
ceived to be anti-union and anti-labor. Moreover, they failed to address land 
reform, perhaps the key issue in the region at that time: huge hereditary 
estates (latifundios) held by 1 per cent of the population controlled 72 per cent 
of the land under cultivation (Todaro 2000: 373). Adam Smith labeled large 
European feudal landholdings 'barbarous institutions' that formed only in 
response to disorderly times. As with estates in Latin America, Smith pre-
dicted that large landholdings would produce lower yields than smallholdings: 
To improve land with profit, like all other commercial projects, requires 
an exact attention to small savings and small gains, of which a man born 
to a great fortune, even though naturally frugal, is very seldom capable. 
The situation of such a person naturally disposes him to attend rather to 
ornament which pleases his fancy, than to profit for which he has so little 
occasion. 
(WN III.ii.7) 
Evidence for lower productivity in Latin America's latifundios has been found 
by numerous researchers (Todaro 2000). 
Because neoliberal reforms emphasized a return to commodity exports, 
they increased the demand for rural labor and would in theory raise real 
wages. But in situations where labor markets are uncompetitive., land 
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distribution highly skewed, and indigenous property rights weak, such 
reforms often produced unintended negative consequences for the poor that 
Smith would have found objectionable (Wight 2001). Military rulers in Gua-
temala, for example - like those in other Latin America countries - often 
used state violence to suppress worker organizations and to expropriate pea-
sant lands for mining and other purposes controlled by elites. A tight oli-
garchy dominated political and economic life (Viscidi 2004). Acemoglu and 
Robinson (2008: 20) note that: 
The conclusion . . . seems to be that to change the political equilibrium 
there needs to be changes in both de jure and de facto power. For 
instance, if there is an elite that is structuring institutions to its benefit 
with adverse aggregate effects, then to engineer a transition to a better 
equilibrium both their de jure and de facto power must be simultaneously 
reformed. 
When Adam Smith wrote that 'The natural effort of every individual to better 
his own condition . . . is so powerful a principle that it is alone . . . capable of 
carrying on the society to wealth and prosperity. . . . ' he added the key qua-
lifying phrase, 'when suffered to exert itself with freedom and security' (WN 
IV.v.b.43). By security Smith meant the legal reforms introduced by Magna 
Carta, the English Revolution, and other institutional safeguards of justice. A 
key property right was to one's person: 
That security which the laws in Great Britain give to every man that he 
shall enjoy the fruits of his own labour is alone sufficient to make any 
country flourish, notwithstanding these and twenty other absurd regula-
tions of commerce. 
(WN IV.v.b.43) 
If Smith were advising Latin American countries in the 1980s, it is unthink-
able that he would proceed without first devoting considerable attention to the 
history of property and labor rights. Smith's reforms would proceed according 
to what the circumstances would permit, not according to ideological or 
theoretical beliefs about ideal market situations. 
International trade 
Adam Smith was well aware of the nuances of the gains and losses from 
opening to trade. Smith's defense of free trade is well-known, exemplified by 
this quote: 
By means of glasses, hotbeds, and hot walls, very good grapes can be 
raised in Scotland, and very good wine too can be made of them at about 
thirty times the expense for which at least equally good can be brought 
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from foreign countries. Would it be a reasonable law to prohibit the 
importation of all foreign wines merely to encourage the making of claret 
and burgundy in Scotland? 
(WN IV.ii.15) 
As with labor markets, however, Smith's trade policies were not constructed in 
isolation. They addressed existing realities of the time, place, and institutions. 
Smith cynically remarked: 'To expect, indeed, that the freedom of trade 
should ever be entirely restored in Great Britain is as absurd as to expect that 
an Oceana or Utopia should ever be established in it' (WN IV.ii.43). In par-
ticular, Smith was sensitive to injustices that could arise from a rapid re-
introduction of free trade (or 'shock therapy' in modem parlance). Smith 
argued for gradualism: 
Hwnanity may in this case require that the freedom of trade should be 
restored only by slow gradations, and with a good deal of reserve and cir-
cwnspection. Were those high duties and prohibitions taken away all at 
once, cheaper foreign goods of the same kind might be poured so fast into 
the home market, as to deprive all at once many thousands of our people 
of their ordinary employment and means of subsistence. The disorder 
which this would occasion might no doubt be very considerable. It would 
in all probability, however, be much less than is commonly imagined .... 
(WN IV.ii.40, emphasis added) 
As if following Smith's advice, Chinese communist rulers (fearing political 
disorder) proceeded cautiously to open select markets after 1978, 'fording the 
river by feeling for the stones'. Smith also noted his concern for owners of 
capital who would be hurt by new trade rules: 
The undertaker of a great manufacture who, by the home markets being 
suddenly laid open to the competition of foreigners, should be obliged to 
abandon his trade, would no doubt suffer very considerably. . . . The 
equitable regard, therefore, to his interest requires that changes of this 
kind should never be introduced suddenly, but slowly, gradually, and after 
a very long warning. 
(WN IV.ii.44) 
In these passages Smith makes two points: that efficiency should be balanced 
with justice for workers and for investors; and that maintaining order is a 
social objective worthy of important consideration. 
Developmental process 
Smith's policy making is thus incremental, geared to allowing slow and 
achievable progress rather than radical revolution. Policy making should 
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not be driven by ideological purity, but by pragmatic considerations of 
what would, at the margin, move society forward with equity and the 
least disruption. Hence, in commenting on an export revenue bounty, Smith 
writes: 
With all its imperfections, however, we may perhaps say of what was said 
of the laws of Solon, that, though not the best in itself, it is the best which 
the interests, prejudices, and temper of the times would admit of. It may 
perhaps in due time prepare the way for a better. 
(WN IV.v.b.53, emphasis added) 
In The Theory of Moral Sentiments Smith explicitly addresses the character 
of a virtuous leader who contents himself with moderating laws and reg-
ulations, consistent with the prejudices of the times. A virtuous leader would 
'respect the established powers and privileges' of individuals and orders, and 
content himself with restraining 'what he often cannot annihilate without 
great violence' (Smith 1976a, TMS Vl.ii.2.16). While a general idea of the 
'perfect' policy is necessary to inform the statesman, 'to insist upon its 
establishing, and upon establishing all at once, and in spite of all opposition, 
every thing which that idea may seem to require, must often be the highest 
degree of arrogance' (TMS VI.ii.2.18). Smith's reserved approach could 
easily have inspired Abraham Lincoln, who abhorred slavery yet argued that 
it should be 'tolerated and protected only because of and so far as its 
actual presence among us makes that toleration and protection a necessity' 
(Lincoln 1860). One should not infer that Smith would himself be as 
tolerant of slavery. 
These points highlight the role that process plays in Smith's conception of 
economic development. Seen from the perspective of millennia, the advance 
of society from hunting and gathering to herding, then to agriculture, and 
finally to industry appears as a seamless advance. Yet at any point in time 
there are wrenching institutional changes to be experienced. The invisible 
hand does not produce perfect results because human instincts work within 
human institutions that must constantly evolve. 'Ghost institutions' linger, 
serving no purpose (Wilson 2007). Smith provides two examples of feudal 
property rights - primogeniture and land engrossing - that anachronistically 
survived for centuries and failed to adapt to the needs of the present (WN III. 
ii.3--4). Hence, while human instincts for betterment lie behind the invisible 
hand, human institutions sometimes 'thwarted those natural inclinations' 
(WN III.i.3 ). Historical circumstances and path dependency limit how well 
the invisible hand can work at any particular point in time (Nozick 
1994: 314). 
As noted by a number of authors, the beneficial spin ascribed to the invi-
sible hand is thus premised on specific institutional, social, and ethical con-
structs (Wight 2007; Grampp 2000; Evensky 1993; Persky 1989). In 
considering limitations of time and place, Smith observed that 'If a nation 
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could not prosper without the enjoyment of perfect liberty and perfect justice, 
there is not in the world a nation which could ever have prospered' (WN IV. 
ix.28). Policies work through imperfect institutions, and Smith was unwilling 
to promote reforms derived merely from ideology and abstracted from local 
context. 
Smith's concerns have been borne out by the widespread disillusionment 
with the cookie-cutter restructuring carried out by the IMF under the guise of 
AACM (Stiglitz 2003). Dani Rodrik writes that 'What [countries] need is not 
a laundry list [of reforms], but an explicitly diagnostic approach that identifies 
priorities based on local realities' (Rodrik 2007: 5). History, culture, and pol-
itics flatten a path and limit the range of options and potential methods that 
can be used effectively. Rodrik thus distinguishes between ideal principles and 
practical policies: 
First-order economic principles - protection of property rights, market-
based competition, appropriate incentives, sound money, and so on - do 
not map into unique policy packages. Reformers have substantial room 
for creatively packaging these principles into institutional designs that are 
sensitive to local opportunities and constraints. 
(2007: 6) 
Adam Smith, who greatly respected the Physiocratic reformers in France who 
advocated laissez-faire, gently chided their leader (Dr. Fram;:ois Quesnay) for 
advocating doctrinaire policies. Smith was ideologically supportive but prag-
matically distant: 
Some speculative physicians seem to have imagined that the health of the 
human body could be preserved only by a certain precise regimen of diet 
and exercise. . . . Mr. Quesnai, who was himself a physician, and a very 
speculative physician, seems to have entertained a notion of the same 
kind concerning the political body, and to have imagined that it would 
thrive and prosper only under a certain precise regimen, the exact regi-
men of perfect liberty and perfect justice. He seems not to have con-
sidered that, in the political body, the natural effort which every man is 
continually making to better his own condition, is a principle of pre-
servation capable of preventing and correcting, in many respects, the bad 
effects of a political economy .... 
(WN IV.ix.28) 
General principles are guiding lights, but when applied unthinkingly can do 
harm. Smith is equally critical of command economy dictators ('the man of 
system') (TMS VI.ii.2.17) as he is of laissez-faire. The linking of Adam 
Smith to the general aims of the AACM is obvious at the surface but trou-
bling for reasons of policy design and implementation elaborated in this 
section. 
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Conclusion 
Adam Smith's soaring rhetoric was written for all ages, yet his explicit policy 
proposals were grounded in the reality of circumstance. This paper offers evi-
dence that Smith would have found good and bad aspects of the AACM as it 
was applied to neoliberal policies in the late twentieth century. Smith would 
likely be critical of economic reforms that focused on short-run efficiency and 
failed to address issues of justice. Smith was also an incremental reformer; he 
understood the problem of path dependency, which blocks the implementa-
tion of perfect states. He would have found it unacceptable to design eco-
nomic policies in the absence of a careful elaboration of historical, cultural, 
and political constraints. 
Smith's physiologic-based critique of Dr. Quesnay in The Wealth of Nations 
provides a metaphor for understanding why, despite his rhetorical flourishes, 
Smith avoided utopian economic policies. Time and place create a context in 
which particular policies need to be crafted. Ideology inspires one's principles, 
but practicality grounds one's practice. The human instinct for betterment 
remains stable over time but institutions must evolve to address changing 
circumstances. However, a particular institution suitable for one period can be 
assumed to become obsolete. Ghost institutions act as a brake on progress 
and carve out a number of different evolutionary solutions. Smith's model 
supports the view that diverse approaches to mixed-market capitalism are 
feasible and desirable given different historical, cultural, and political cir-
cumstances. 
This understanding provides two possible responses to the question, 'ls the 
Anglo-American style capitalism passing away?' The response is yes, if by this 
we mean the blind application of neoclassical theory without regard to con-
text. The response is no, if we consider the dedication to freedom and justice 
that lie behind Smith's version of the AACM. 
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